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Abstract 
This paper explores the conflicts of interest present in science policy and how claims being 
made for evidence based science can be used to suppress critical social science research.  The 
specific case presented concerns the attempts to ban and censor my work criticising the 
economics of carbon emissions trading while I was working for the Commonwealth 
Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in Australia.  The role of management 
and the Science Minister are documented through their own public statements.  The case 
raises general issues about the role of epistemic communities in the production of knowledge, 
the potential for manipulation of information under the guise of quality control and the 
problems created by claiming a fact-value dichotomy in the science-policy interface.  The 
implications go well beyond just climate change research and challenge how public policy is 
being formulated in modern industrial societies where scientific knowledge and corporate 
interests are closely intertwined. 
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1 
I. Introduction 
In recent times, conducting environmental research has become an increasingly dangerous 
activity for the researcher.  Revealing the biophysical and social reality of our economic 
systems threatens a range of vested interest groups who rely upon resource exploitation, 
pollution and environmental destruction as necessary business practices.  The capital 
accumulating growth imperative dominates modern society—East, West, South and North—
and anything that is deemed a threat to the beneficiaries of this system is subject to their 
attack by whatever means necessary. 
Carbon markets create a new set of beneficiaries who include fossil fuel corporations, 
large polluters, financial intermediaries, banks and speculators.  They are a neoliberal 
triumph supporting the idea that markets can solve environmental problems, and show the 
way forward for addressing other problems such as biodiversity loss (Spash 2011).  Research 
on carbon markets inevitably either supports, makes apologia for or criticises a set of 
institutions and organisations in society.  Criticism, no matter how legitimate or revealing of 
the inability of carbon markets to address climate change, means becoming a target for 
political attack. 
Undermining the credibility of the natural and social scientific basis for 
environmental concern can be seen as aiding the maintenance of a weak market-based 
regulatory approach.  This has been most prominent in the human induced climate change 
policy arena due to the rise of climate denialism and its sponsorship by right wing think-tanks 
from the United States of America (USA) (Jacques et al. 2008).  The campaign of denial 
waged against the science that supports action to prevent human induced climate change is 
merely the latest form of corporate sponsored attempts to avoid radical greenhouse gas 
mitigation.  Direct political lobbying by corporations in the USA to fight the Kyoto Protocol 
in the late 1990s amounted to at least $US100 million (Grubb et al. 1999: 112).  Supposedly 
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scientific economic studies emphasising control costs and downplaying the benefits of 
mitigation (i.e. avoided damages) were funded by electric power generators from the USA 
and then cited as evidence against taking action (Chapman and Khanna 2000; Spash 2002: 
160).  Exxon corporation, copying the tactics of the tobacco industry, has been involved in 
documented campaigning to spread misinformation on human induced climate change 
(Union of Concerned Scientists 2007).  Yet all this has not seemed enough.  When corporate 
lobbying and media campaigns proved inadequate the tactics moved to discrediting scientists 
as untrustworthy.  For example, the equivalent of industrial espionage was employed in the 
“Climategate” case of the University of East Anglia email theft and publication, and this was 
followed-up with an internet campaign where numerous right-wing bloggers claimed climate 
science is nothing but a religion (Nerlich 2010).  Attempts to silence climate researchers has 
also involved direct harassment, threats of violence and death threats (Hamilton 2011).  In 
Australia, public debate has been subject to use of the full arsenal of weaponry supplied to 
the climate deniers by their corporate backers who control or are connected to powerful 
media outlets (as detailed in a series of articles for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
by Clive Hamilton 2010a; b; c; d; e). 
While the level and open vehemence of the orchestrated international attack on 
human induced climate change research appears new, the general phenomena is far from 
uncommon.  Questions over the scientific credibility of environmental arguments have been 
repeatedly raised with respect to the harms posed by new technologies, from nuclear power 
(Carter 1987) to genetic modification (Burgess 1999; Robins 2012; Sarewitz 2004).  For 
years industry has backed the organised denial of health impacts from DDT, smoking, 
asbestos, lead and so on (Markowitz and Rosner 2002; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  
Research exploiting scientific uncertainty has been funded by corporations to delay 
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government regulation of, and action against, harmful company products and practices 
(Michaels 2005). 
Researching human induced climate change and addressing how to control 
greenhouse gases is inherently about revealing the structure of power relationships in society.  
In this context, a highly relevant concern is that of Galbraith (2007 [1967]) for the 
undemocratic power wielded by professional corporate managers (whom he termed the 
technostructure) and their ability to capture those agencies meant to be regulating the 
corporations within which they, the managers, operate.  The institutions—conventions, norms 
and formally sanction rules—of scientific research seem to provide poor protection against 
vested interest groups for environmental researchers entering the minefield of public policy.  
Indeed researchers often seem unaware that the science-policy interface is a battlefield where 
the contest is for control over the role and status of knowledge in modern society. 
Rather than abstractly speculating on these matters, I will detail the treatment of my 
own critical research on carbon emissions trading in order to reveal how political sensitivities 
can arise in research.  More specifically I will report on my personal experience working as a 
Science Leader, and Senior Civil Servant, in Australia for the Commonwealth Scientific 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) between 2006 and 2009.  I had been head hunted 
for this role within their Sustainable Ecosystems Division.  As an economist with an 
interdisciplinary research record, I was promised an open remit to build-up, develop and lead 
‘blue skies research’ on environmental values and policy.  The CSIRO, a leading national and 
international scientific research organisation (employing 6,500 people), was and remains an 
organisation dominated by those trained in the natural sciences and engineering, 
supplemented by a handful of mainstream economists and a small sprinkling of other social 
scientists.  The dominant belief within the organisation is in a modernist tradition that regards 
science as creating an objective value free knowledge on the basis of empiricism.  From 
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2007, a corporate trained manager, Dr. Megan Clark, became the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the CSIRO.  She had previously worked in the Australian mining industry with its 
heavy involvement in the high greenhouse gas emitting aluminium and coal sectors. 
In detailing the treatment of my work critical of carbon trading, by Dr. Clark and 
others, I will show how, in practice, norms supposed to achieve quality control can be 
perverted to achieve justifications for censorship and suppression of politically sensitive 
work.  In this case, the CSIRO was brought into disrepute in public media and the Australian 
Senate for allegedly engaging in censorship.  However, there was no impact on the structures 
used to control and manipulate information, and indeed they were reinforced by the a 
posterior defence of the need for even greater direct managerial ‘quality’ control.  This can 
then be seen as providing a carte blanche for future potential censorship. 
The case study raises general questions about the foundation of scientific ‘evidence-
based’ policy, how Western democracies can suffer from the suppression of information of 
substantive public interest, and how the spreading role of managerialism from the corporate 
world is being used to control research and researchers.  The case study shows how the 
mythical fact-value dichotomy, presumed by the naïve objectivism of much contemporary 
natural scientific and economic research,2 collapses and why the sociology and politics of 
science cannot be ignored.  The attempt to totally separate climate science (as fact) from 
policy (as value laden) is then revealed as deeply flawed and also a poor defence for 
researchers, especially social scientists.  This raises questions as to how regulatory design, 
such as carbon markets and alternatives to them, can be debated in an open and explicitly 
value laden research context, and how the necessary societal debate should be conducted 
concerning the future of our social, ecological and economic systems. 
                                                 
2 For further explanation of the meaning and use of the term naïve objectivism and its 




II. Carbon Trading and the  Science-Policy Interface in Australia 
Amongst OECD countries, Australia is the highest per capita emitter of all greenhouse gases 
combined, and in 2009 overtook the USA as the highest per capita source of CO2 emissions 
(Lo and Spash 2012).  The Kyoto Protocol committment did not require the country to reduce 
emission but rather limited any increase in emissions to 8 per cent over 1990 levels.  Despite 
this, the Australian government under John Howard’s Liberal Party opposed the restriction 
and Australia only ratified the treaty in 2008 after a change of national government to Kevin 
Rudd’s Labor Party.  The Rudd government then staked its reputation on getting an emissions 
trading scheme in place.  This was an idea originally floated by the Howard government.  
Entitled a ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme’, it was contentious and, in 2009, struggling 
to get passed into legislation by the Senate.  In Australia coal is King and the mining sector is 
powerful and politically influential.  The political support for the scheme was shifting and 
corporations exploited this to the full by negotiating massive multi-billion dollar permit 
bonanzas for the worst polluters.  Despite this effort by Rudd, to buy-off the big fossil fuel 
interests and their political allies, the scheme was voted down by the Senate in the middle of 
2009.  At the end of that year, when my censorship case was at its height, a second vote was 
to be held and Senate debates were a hot topic for Australian media attention.  The proposed 
free permit transfers to the corporate greenhouse gas emitters were being increased, but 
media attention seemed more preoccupied with climate change denial.  Tensions were high 
when the Senate narrowly voted the scheme down for a second time and dealt a major blow 
to the credibility of the Rudd government. 
Julia Gillard was then able to ascend to the prime ministerial role in Australia after an 
internal Labor Party coup.  That coup was inspired by the failure to get the carbon emissions 
trading scheme into legislation, and the disaffection of the mining sector due to a proposed 
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tax on their profits.  Gillard substantially revised the mining tax in consultation with 
corporate leaders.  She then called a general election in July, 2010, that resulted in a hung 
parliament.  The Labor Party managed to form a minority government supported by the 
Australian Greens and three Independents who favoured carbon pricing.  This has been 
described as Australia’s climate change election, because the expectation at the time was that 
Labor would be forced by the Greens to adopt a stronger environmental position (Rootes 
2011). 
The resulting compromise scheme was a carbon tax for three years leading to an 
emissions trading scheme in 2015.  Like its predecessor it offered large financial transfers to 
the worst polluters.  Australia had done nothing to limit emissions to the Kyoto mandated 
increase of 8% on 1990 levels, and the Gillard scheme limited itself to reducing the rate of 
increase (i.e. choosing a base of 5 per cent reductions now on 2000 levels rather than 1990 
levels).  While touted as a major environmental success the reality was not impressive at all 
and seemed unlikely to do little to control Australia’s runaway greenhouse gas emissions 
(Spash and Lo 2012). 
In 2013 Gillard lost a leadership election within the Labor party and Rudd returned to 
become Prime Minister once again.  A national election soon followed that Rudd and the 
Labor Party lost to Tony Abbot and a right wing coalition government.  Abbot vowed, as one 
of his first acts, he would remove the carbon tax/trading scheme established by the Labor 
coalition. 
 
The Brave New World of Carbon Trading 
In February 2009 I completed drafting an article on carbon emission trading schemes for a 
special issue of New Political Economy, a leading academic journal in the field of economics 
and public policy.  The article argued that carbon emissions trading schemes are 
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fundamentally flawed and it critically analysed support for their recommendation.  I used a 
descriptive, institutional and logical analysis to deconstruct claims made by economic 
theorists and carbon market designers.  The argument was not directed at any specific country 
or scheme design, but written as a general critique using a variety of examples to illustrate 
key points.  A common position amongst economists was, and remains, that emissions 
trading schemes are the most efficient regulatory control for pollution and any 
implementation problems they encounter can be solved by simple redesign.  My paper 
criticised both the claim of economic efficiency for carbon emissions trading and argued 
redesign was not feasible given the structure of the real economy (e.g., the power of 
corporations, the banking and finance sectors) which such economists fail to take into 
account.  The paper also raised a variety of concerns over the operation of carbon markets 
including greenhouse gas accounting, permit allocation, the clean development mechanism, 
and the role of voluntary offset markets. 
As a Science Leader within the CSIRO my work was subject to an internal review 
process prior to sending an article off to a journal.  This was often treated as no more than a 
formality, especially for a senior researcher, and the process was not anonymous.  However, 
on this occasion, prior to completion of the internal review process, my divisional manager, 
Dr. Daniel Walker, intervened citing concerns over the political sensitivity of the work. 
At the time the Australian Senate was soon to conduct its first debate over whether to 
pass the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, which aimed to establish greenhouse gas 
emissions trading.  The divisional manager noted a requirement within the CSIRO that the 
Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (then Senator Kim Carr) be informed 
when politically sensitive research was due to appear.  That was, apparently, meant to be 
merely an information process not a control or influence on the research findings.  However, 
the divisional manager also expressed his concern that the contents be judged of high quality 
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and thus be defensible against the Minister.  To that end he requested a higher standard than 
internal review, cited international peer review as such a standard and agreed, with myself 
and my co-author, that this would most easily be achieved by immediate submission to the 
international journal for which the paper had been written. 
The paper was therefore formally submitted to the journal New Political Economy.  
This meant it was sent out for international peer review by the journal while the internal 
CSIRO review was still on-going.  Shortly after, the internal review (now superseded by the 
international review process) was completed and, while noting the political sensitivities, 
approved publication with some minor suggestions.  A working paper would normally have 
then been published and made available online, but in this case was delayed awaiting the 
international review.  The journal's international anonymous refereeing process resulted in 
my receiving a report that noted the positive contributions of the paper, made some critical 
remarks and suggested several revisions and amendments.  All the points made by the 
international referees’ report were then addressed and responses to each and every point 
noted in a cover letter to the journal editor, who accepted the revised paper.  My divisional 
manager was informed of the successful forthcoming publication and as a courtesy sent the 
referees’ report, response and revised version. 
At this point something unusual happened.  A few days later I received an email from 
Dr. Walker stating that the publication should be withdrawn from the journal to undergo 
further internal review and discussion.  A totally ad hoc procedure was suggested involving a 
further three unnamed managers, as well as input from his superior Dr. Andrew Johnson and 
from those driving the CSIRO’s Carbon Strategy.  Research at the CSIRO involved 
investigating various schemes that might have been expected to benefit directly from making 
carbon into a valuable commodity through emissions trading (e.g., carbon sequestration in 
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forestry and agriculture, carbon capture and storage for coal fired power stations, clean coal 
technologies and more).  The reasons stated for stopping publication were that: 
“This paper deals with an extremely important public policy issue for Australia (and 
globally) and raises significant considerations.  The proposed ETS is extremely 
politically sensitive at present.” (email 24th June 2009). 
I refused to withdraw the paper from the journal and stated my intention to publish without 
CSIRO affiliation.  This stalemate continued through various meetings until Dr. Walker 
himself wrote directly to the journal stating the paper must be withdrawn for not having 
completed “internal CSIRO approval and review processes”. 
Over the course of several meetings and correspondence this same manager 
repeatedly made clear that the reason for stopping publication was purely concern over 
unspecified political sensitivities.  Three options were at one point tabled: publication with 
CSIRO affiliation, publication without affiliation, no publication.  However, after conferring 
with his superiors, only the last option was deemed suitable.  This led to the CSIRO 
discussing their claim over anything I might write (including in a personal capacity) which 
would have had the effect of allowing them to prevent me from publishing the paper even as 
a private citizen.  My co-author, also a CSIRO employee, had several visits from 
management, feared for his job and withdrew from the paper.3 
In light of previous concerns over gagging of climate scientists within the CSIRO, 
freedom to ‘speak’ about research of public interest was still deemed permissible.  An 
understood option was to claim no affiliation and present ideas as an individual.  The CSIRO 
                                                 
3 Since this case, an increasingly vocal group of CSIRO employees have been making 
complaints about bullying and harassment within the organisation (e.g., Victims of CSIRO 
http://victimsofcsiro.com/).  The CSIRO's managers were forced to respond after being held 
in breach of regulations by Comcare (the official government health and safely at work 
watchdog), and in 2013 initiated their own inquiry which reports back to themselves.  The 
consistent suppression and dismissal of Whistleblowers and their reports left little doubt 
amongst victims that this would be a management whitewashing exercise. 
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Charter states “Researchers who speak as individuals should not claim to represent an 
organisation”.  So, about 5 months after the publication ban was applied, I submitted the 
paper to an international conference for anonymous review as an independent researcher 
(with no CSIRO affiliation) so it could be accepted for presentation.  I was later criticised by 
management for not seeking approval to present.  Many CSIRO staff presented at the same 
conference and I know of only one person having sought official approval for doing so,4 
despite (unlike me) presenting their work under the CSIRO banner. 
A few days after the conference presentation the matter became front page national 
news with the Australian running the headline “CSIRO Carbon Trade Dissenter Silenced”, 
2nd November 2009.  Their concern was the attempted suppression of information of public 
interest by CSIRO management.  That led to the CEO, Dr. Clark, calling me to a meeting at 
CSIRO headquarters.  During this meeting she expressed little concern over the content of the 
paper and stated only “tiny changes” would be required to meet her requirements, namely 
conforming to “the Charter” (the need for tiny changes was also reported in Nature, see 
Pincock 2009).  The CSIRO then made a press release stating the paper would be published 
after all. 
The Charter is an agreement that had been signed with Science Minister Senator Carr.  
This was meant to be a document that affirmed the freedom of speech of CSIRO researchers 
and, as Senator Carr had stated in a press release, defended “frank and fearless” debate.  This 
implied debate without ministerial or government intervention.  However, the text ends with 
the following sentence: 
                                                 
4 The one person was my former co-author, who was then asked by his line manager why he 
was bothering to seek permission?  He was told this was unnecessary, but as he insisted he 
got official approval. 
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“As CSIRO employees, they should not advocate, defend or publicly debate 
the merits of government or opposition policies (including policies of previous 
Commonwealth government, or State or local or foreign governments).” 
This sentence leaves much open to interpretation.  It could be seen as merely stating ‘avoid 
being partisan’, or it could be taken as a total ban on any research deemed as touching on any 
government policy anywhere in the world at anytime.  Taking the latter position would mean 
banning most, if not all, CSIRO research.  For example, amongst other things, the 
organisation advocates clean coal technology, carbon sequestration, Green jobs, extracting 
wealth from the oceans, adaptation to climate change, biotechnology and publishes food diet 
books.  All these are quite clearly areas of government policy.  In addition, the CSIRO takes 
specific positions on water and land use, farming practices, management of pests, wildlife 
and biodiversity, and much else. 
This one sentence of the Charter provides a key instrument for control of information 
flowing from the organisation.  At the time of my meeting with the CEO, I was led to believe 
a few minor word changes would address the Charter.  Within a week of that meeting I was 
given an ultimatum to accept an anonymously changed paper which (among other things) had 
cut crucial sentences and text (11% in total) and halved the concluding section.5  I was called 
to a meeting of senior managers, including Andrew Johnson, at which the CEO informed me 
to either accept all the changes as they were, with no input on my part, or have the paper ban 
imposed once again and also be personally banned from speaking to the press.  I chose the 
bans. 
                                                 
5 Dr Clark indicated, at our meeting, that the referees would include Dr. Alex Wonhas, a 
physicist, appointed in August 2009, to lead the CSIRO Energy Transform Flagship, from a 
job at the management consultants McKinsey & Co.  Wonhas had previously co-authored a 
report on greenhouse gas control costs that claimed to be presenting the “factual basis” for 
policy while advocating carbon trading and the benefits of engaging in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Lewis et al. 2008).  My paper, besides being critical of emission 
trading and specifically the Clean Development Mechanism, criticised this type of economic 
cost calculation and efficiency analysis. 
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The essence of the censored version of the paper was to substantively change the 
argument concerning carbon emissions trading.  My argument involved a series of points to 
establish that emissions trading is fundamentally flawed as an approach.  This involves 
failures by mainstream economists to take into account economic and social reality such as 
corporate power, strong uncertainty and the exploitation of the poor to establish carbon 
offsets.  The censorship removed key sentences and paragraphs so that the revised argument 
took the familiar mainstream environmental economist's line that, while emission trading has 
its problems, these things require more research and through redesign, over enough time, 
such schemes can be improved and all issues resolved.  Strangely enough putting the cut text 
together created a coherent critique of emissions trading.6 
The issue did not stop with the ban by Dr Clark because the Green party lobbied the 
Australian Senate to hold a debate about the paper and the issue of government censorship at 
the CSIRO.  That debate led to a motion passing which instructed Senator Carr to table the 
paper in the Senate as a matter of public interest, something which he initially refused to do.7  
When he acquiesced, after further Senate pressure, the paper appeared in a version which had 
been submitted to the aforementioned international conference for peer review.  Senator Carr 
(using parliamentary privilege) also simultaneously tabled a personal attack on my character 
in the form of a letter written by Dr. Clark.  In that letter she threatened me with unspecified 
punishment for having presented the paper at the conference and included copies from a 
webpage showing it had already been published online. 
Indeed, the paper had miraculously appeared as an online publication, without my 
knowledge, just a few hours before Senator Carr presented it in the Senate.  A conference 
proceedings website had suddenly released the paper without seeking or being given any 
                                                 
6 The edited text the CSIRO wanted cut from the document can be found online at 
http://www.clivespash.org/OrwellianGuidetoCarbonETS.pdf. 
7 This was happening at exactly the same time as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
was being debated in the Senate. 
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permission, and despite the ban status of the paper being common public knowledge.8  A 
mystery surrounds how the CEO of the CSIRO knew about this release and, within a few 
hours of its posting, was able to write a letter about it and supply a copy of both to the 
Minister in time for his Senate appearance.  Personally, I only heard of the online posting 
during the public broadcast of the Senate tabling of the paper by Senator Carr, and I had it 
removed within hours after contacting the website manager. 
I resigned within a week of these events having concluded the organisation to which I 
belonged lacked all credibility and its scientific integrity was being compromised by senior 
management.  This ensured the publication of the internationally peer reviewed version of the 
paper in an unadulterated form.9  I was also free to speak about the contents, which I did in a 
series of public lectures around Australia.10  The publication was officially released as an 
independent discussion paper (Spash 2009) and later as a journal article (Spash 2010a).  
However, the story did not stop there. 
 
III. Quality, Peer Review and Political Control 
A few months after I resigned, the CSIRO, represented by its CEO, Dr. Clark, and Head of 
the Environment Division, Dr. Andrew Johnson, appeared before the Senate Estimates 
                                                 
8 The organisation, the Australian branch of the society for ecological economics, responsible 
for releasing the paper online was at the time headed by a senior CSIRO employee.  The vice 
president, and former president of the society, had also been a senior CSIRO employee, only 
recently having moved to the Department of Climate Change to directly advise the Labor 
government on emission trading.  In a televised broadcast of the Senate debates on emissions 
trading in November 2009 he could be seen supplying Senator Penny Wong with answers to 
various questions.  Both the societies president and vice-president were fully aware of the ban 
on the paper and had previously spoken directly with me about it. 
9 Actually the journal's publishers, Routledge Journal Division of Taylor & Francis, fearing 
litigation, wrote to the CSIRO seeking their approval before they would proceed with 
publication.  My previous divisional manager sent them approval on the basis that I had 
resigned and there would be no CSIRO affiliation.  Although he simultaneously claimed the 
paper had already been published; presumably hoping this would affect publication. 
10 Links to a full length lecture presentation of the paper, radio interviews, news articles and 
related documentation, as well as the paper itself, can be found on line at 
www.clivespash.com. 
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Committee, 10th February 2010.  During discussion of my case, Senator Carr went on record 
making direct derogatory comments about the paper.  In addition, he supported the latest 
position of the CSIRO management as to why the paper could not be published. 
Now apparently the paper had been too low in quality.  In the Official Hansard 
transcript of that meeting Dr. Clark, stated: 
“This was always an issue of quality; it was always an issue of maintaining the 
standards of the organisation.  We always encouraged Dr Spash to publish the 
paper.  I personally encouraged him to do so.” (Australian Senate 2010: E48). 
Later she stated that: 
“In this case, the scientist was not prepared to make those changes to meet the 
quality.  But there was always the encouragement to publish this work and to 
get it out there into the arena with quality changes that we required.” 
(Australian Senate 2010: E50). 
Senator Carr intervened in the questioning of Dr. Clark and made two claims.  First, 
he tried to claim the paper had been published as a conference proceeding so there was no 
issue of a ban.  Second, he tried to deride the paper itself by quoting a confidential referees 
report from the journal in which it was accepted.  This was the report I sent my divisional 
manager, Dr. Walker, along with my comprehensive response to referees comments, prior to 
the first banning of the paper.  Clearly CSIRO managers passed the confidential peer review 
to Senator Carr.  In his attempt to deride my work the Senator chose half sentences and bits 
and pieces of the confidential referees report.  After quoting these he stated: 
“In my judgement, this is a clear case of CSIRO defending the brand name of 
this organisation and has absolutely nothing to do with the personal political 
opinions of the author of this paper.” (Australian Senate 2010 E49). 
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This is rather strange as prior to my resignation the CSIRO management claimed the right to 
stop me publishing the paper even without their brand name on it.  In addition, he chose to 
cite the external referees report because there was no document or statement from the CSIRO 
showing any internal concern over the publication's quality prior to my resignation. 
Senator Carr did not stop there in his attempt to claim his support for quality 
assurance at the CSIRO.  He stated: 
“As a former schoolteacher, I really wondered whether or not this was the sort 
of thing we would be employing people to write on behalf of the CSIRO.  The 
quality just was not there.” (Australian Senate 2010: E50). 
This from a Science Minister who, when launching Charters to protect the integrity and 
independence of public research agencies, had gone on record supporting the scientific peer 
review process, the importance of avoiding government intervention in that process and the 
need for "frank and fearless debate".  He had then stated (press release 16th January 2008): 
"The value of scientific endeavour and importance of vigorous and transparent 
public debate, unfettered by political interference but subject to peer review, is 
something I have advocated for my entire public life." 
When questioned by Mark Colvin of the ABC (broadcast 24th February 2010) about the 
treatment of my paper, the office of Science Minister Carr stated that: 
“Clive Spash may have made some revisions but the revisions did not address 
all the concerns of the reviewer and still failed to meet the standards of quality 
required of a CSIRO paper.” 
This baseless claim is flatly contradicted both by the support for publication of the 
paper from CSIRO's internal reviewers, the point by point revisions addressing all 
referees comments and subsequent acceptance for publication by the journal editors at 
New Political Economy.  The fact that the journal is internationally peer reviewed had 
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actually been regarded as a higher standard than that of the CSIRO internal review.  
Indeed, New Political Economy was ranked ‘A’ class by the Australian Research 
Council in their 2010 Excellence in Research Assessment report. 
This direct political intervention in the case raises serious concerns about the 
independence of scientific review in Australia, especially by its government agencies and 
specifically the CSIRO.  Senator Carr had intervened in a process to deride a paper, prior to 
its actual publication, on the basis of comments which had led to its revision and subsequent 
acceptance.  In a letter (dated 24th November 2009) from Professor O’Neill to Senator Carr 
the editors of New Political Economy had made clear their position.11 
“the CSIRO is asking not for minor but for major changes in the central 
arguments of the paper.  This is clearly unacceptable to the author.  I should 
add that is also unacceptable to me as the editor of the special issue.  It 
involves interference in our own peer-reviewing procedures that would be 
incompatible with academic integrity of the journal.” 
The letter from the journal also addressed the role of Dr. Clark in demanding changes to the 
paper. 
“What is clearly improper is for her to use her position to insist on changes to 
the paper which alter its conclusions prior to publication.  No international 
journal would accept a paper under those circumstances.  Neither would or 
should any academic scientist be expected to agree to such alterations to his or 
her work.” 
Both Senator Carr and the CSIRO management took a stand that placed their own (non-
specialist) opinion above that of the expert peer review process, a process that the Science 
                                                 
11 In response to a question by Senator Eggleston in Senate Estimates, 31st May 2010, Senator 
Carr’s Office denied any knowledge of the letter sent to him by Professor O’Neill on behalf 
of the journal, New Political Economy, or that he had read it and so denied being able to table 
the letter as requested. 
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Minister had himself claimed was the ultimate test of quality for engaging in public debate.  
Their claims of poor quality and no political motivation for the banning of the paper must 
confront the facts.  None were prepared to publicly debate the contents of the paper or even 
specify any issues of concern. 
The case reappeared in later Senate Estimates Committee meetings and the CSIRO 
was forced to explain themselves further.  This involved a new elaboration of why the paper 
was banned compared to other similar work, and specifically the public advocacy of the 
Gillard government’s climate policy by CSIRO’s Dr. Wonhas (see also footnote 4).  In 
response to a question (SI-71, 19th October 2011) by Senator Colbeck, the CSIRO reiterated 
claims of the need for quality control and meeting the Charter, but also stated: 
“The issues related to Dr Spash were not about the content of his paper, nor were they 
related to any public comments regarding his paper. ... CSIRO’s internal review 
concluded that the original paper did not report new research or present empirical 
evidence to support all of the authors’ conclusions.  The paper was also viewed as 
offering opinion on matters of government policy by applying a critique of 
neoclassical economic theory to the ETS.  Therefore it was not approved for 
publication.” 
So now, besides falsely claiming the CSIRO only publishes evidence-based on empiricism, 
criticism of neoclassical economic theory had also become a reason for banning research 
work on emissions trading!  What is this if not a matter of content? 
During the Senate Estimates discussion of February 2010, an interesting remark came 
from Dr. Clark in terms of the control management have over the science coming out of the 
CSIRO: 
“Our processes are very consistent across all our scientists in terms of working 
with them to make sure they are published in the most appropriate journals, 
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making sure that the science is robust, making sure that the conclusions can be 
drawn upon that science.” 
My former line-manager wrote to Dr. Clark about her Senate Estimates statements.  His letter 
was entitled “Misinformation given to Senate Estimate committee” (dated 1st March 2010).  
In this letter he made clear that, in his opinion, Dr Clark and Senator Carr had mislead the 
parliamentary committee and Dr Clark had abused the peer review system in releasing 
confidential referees reports to the Senator.  In addition, he also made clear his belief that the 
quality of the paper was actually diminished after CSIRO editing. 
Even more seriously, this raises questions regarding what goes on behind the scenes at 
the CSIRO.  Prior to becoming CEO of CSIRO, Dr. Clark built her career in the mining 
industry and was a vice-president at BHP Billiton, one of the largest resource extracting 
multinationals in the world (which publicly proclaims its active engagement in extracting 
coal, petroleum and aluminium, amongst other natural resources).  This has inevitably led to 
expressions of concern and speculation over the influence on the CSIRO of corporate 
interests, the powerful Australian mining sector and specifically 'big coal' (Manning 2010). 
In all this some things are very clear.  Massive financial transfers to polluters have been 
an essential part of the design being employed by emissions trading schemes to get buy-in 
from powerful vested interest groups.  The Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
was no different and built-in generous 'allowances' for the coal, aluminium and petrol driven 
transport sectors (Spash 2010a), and this was repeated under the scheme passed into 
legislation by the Gillard government (Spash and Lo 2012).  Similarly, the gains to be made 
by the finance and banking sectors in running a new multi-billion dollar commodity market 
have been touted as a great economic opportunity (Stern 2006: 270), rather than a massive 
transaction cost to society.  My work indicated how these financial flows are more 
appropriately characterised as side payments, bribes and deadweight loss.  As this work 
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brought the development of carbon markets into question, it became an act threatening the 
potential for those massive transfers, speculative gains and rent capture to take place or 
continue.  Rather than enter into “frank and fearless debate”, the Minister and CSIRO 
management sought to discredit the work.  The strategies employed escalated from changing 
the content, to suppressing the whole work, to attacking the author and his reputation, to 
finally questioning the quality of the work and its scientific credibility. 
 
IV. The Sociology and Politics of Knowledge 
Knowledge (whether regarded as objective, subjective or something else) is necessarily 
embedded within social institutions.  Scientific knowledge is produced by epistemic 
communities of scholars that have developed elaborate intellectual and social organisations to 
demarcate what is to be regarded as communal activity and how it should be conducted.  
Essentially, such scholarly communities, as social groups, control the way work is carried 
out, the goals of that work and who is employed to conduct such work.  Interdependency 
creates community-based research standards as to competent use of research techniques to 
enable knowledge transfer.  Researchers who fail to fit within this structure of dependency 
are regarded as not producing the right kind of knowledge and can be marginalised within or 
excluded from the community. 
The epistemic community of scholars, investigators, analysts and others in any given 
research field can be regarded as being united by a set of norms of social behaviour, i.e. 
institutions of group and individual control over and validation of information.  The range of 
practices for establishing hard-core ‘scientific’ credibility are then often regarded as self-
evident, including such things as: peer review, mathematical formalism, experimental 
method, employing data and statistics, writing in the third person, avoiding explicit 
engagement in politics and trying to exclude value laden statements.  For many, perhaps 
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most, within a community the conventions, norms and rules are not even perceived as such, 
they are just part of what defines their occupational practice. 
Lee (2009: 12) explains this social organisation of science, and the interdependency 
of its members, as involving several factors including: 
• the nature of the audience for which the scientific output is intended; 
• control over (i) the means of production of scientific knowledge, including the 
equipment, techniques and labouring skills, (ii) the format in which it is reported, and 
(iii) the communication outlets, such as journals; 
• the role of individual and institutional reputations in affecting both the production 
(e.g. what is accepted) and the goals of scientific knowledge; 
• and the role of state and other organisational power outside the science community in 
legitimizing, supporting or otherwise affecting scientific knowledge, its goals and the 
reputations of specific individuals. 
Thus, a range of quite different social systems (e.g., hierarchical managerially controlled vs. 
diffuse locally coordinated) can exist for the production of scientific knowledge with 
implications both for the type of work produced and how it is employed.  Indeed, the 
intellectual and social organisation of such work, and who it is deemed to involve, is 
historically and consciously determined by its participants and the recipients of scientific 
knowledge (Lee 2009: 13). 
Both the social and natural sciences share this communal framing of knowledge but 
have developed different practices of work.  An important institution they share in common is 
independent and generally (but not always) anonymous peer review for quality evaluation.  In 
democratic states, the intellectual and social organisation of work for both has been a matter 
for the scientific communities involved.  Yet, as the case study indicates, this process is also 
susceptible to control or manipulation by those in powerful positions and gate keeper roles. 
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Which journals are “appropriate”, who decides and on what basis?  Who selects 
referees and how?  When is managerial consistency in publication practice merely code for 
uniform control and manipulation of what gets published?  Why should empirical data and 
quantification be regarded as the test of ‘truth’?  On what substantive grounds is qualitative 
data or descriptive analysis regarded as less robust than quantitative data?  Why is work of 
social scientists typically treated as less ‘hard’ or ‘objective’ than that of natural scientists 
and on what basis?  Who should be the judge and who the jury in these matters?  These 
questions relate to the philosophy and conduct of science as well as its relationship to public 
policy and political process in a democracy. 
All social and natural scientists produce their work within a specific social and 
institutional context.  At its best this can provide an empowering collegiate atmosphere where 
challenging common goals are set and tackled through collaboration amongst senior and 
junior researchers alike.  At its worst this can be a disempowering hierarchical system of 
control where research managers force colleagues into serving narrow politically motivated 
ends.  Derision of politically unpalatable research findings is then carried out via ad hominem 
remarks, harassment, bullying and questioning the scientific quality and credibility of the 
results on totally unscientific grounds. 
The problem facing us today is the extent to which the latter approach is becoming 
dominant and there is creeping censorship of science in research by official government 
process in supposedly democratic states (Spash 2010b).  In 2009, while I was fighting my 
case in Australia, Professor David Nutt was getting sacked by the UK government for 
speaking openly on the relative merits of drugs versus alcohol (Tran 2009).  Then in the USA 
there was the case, closer to my own, of two EPA lawyers told to remove and then edit parts 
out of a video critical of emissions trading (Broeder and Kaufman 2009).  More recently, in 
Canada public muzzling of government scientists seems to have become a legitimate political 
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policy (Ghosh 2012).  These high profile cases involving government employees are likely 
the tip of the iceberg. 
As neoliberal governments are elected around the world, the rhetoric of austerity is 
employed to shut down research which asks too many unwanted and difficult questions.  
Indeed, my own former social science division at the CSIRO, Sustainable Ecosystems, was 
quickly closed after I left, and the social scientists merged with entomologists within a 
natural science dominated Ecosystem Science division.  This is now led by my former 
divisional manager, Dr. Walker, who advocates an evidence-based science approach. 
Government agencies and institutions, as well as individual civil servants, that try to 
protect the environment and society by exposing damaging development, harmful 
technologies and industrial pollution are subject to being removed under the guise of 
reducing red tape and increasing free market competition, boosting growth and providing 
jobs.  Employing those with corporate experience to manage research (as in the CSIRO) 
further muddies the waters between the independence of science and the objectives of vested 
interest groups.  In such a climate of fear civil servants are most vulnerable and self-
censorship prevails.  Yet the myth remains that if research is factual, empirically based, and 
avoids comment on policy, then researchers have nothing to fear. 
 
V. The Artificial Division of Science from Policy and Facts from Values 
In 2010, Australia's chief scientist, advising the government on all scientific issues, was 
Penny Sackett.  She took a very traditional view of the science policy interface.  That is, one 
which claims the trust of people in science as progress is evident in their adoption and use of 
technology, and the only real problem for science is one of communication, i.e. the public 
disagree with scientists because they are ill-informed and misunderstand scientific facts.  Her 
belief in scientists directly observing facts as truth reflects a naïve objectivist position (see 
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Sayer 2010).  In a TV interview on ABC's Lateline (broadcast 18th March 2010) she stated 
that: “a CSIRO scientist can and should speak out clearly on matters of scientific evidence”.  
Yet when asked directly about my case she stated:  
“The question is, when that crosses lines of policy there are matter [sic] – 
employment practices in the CSIRO that draw a distinction between matters of 
policy and matters of science and those matters are handled internally by the 
CSIRO.  But I think one thing we can feel quite confident of is that the quality 
of research that is done by those researchers is recognised the world over as of 
the highest international standard.” 
She went on to draw a distinction, or division, between “the science of climate change as 
opposed to a particular political solution to address climate change”.  Suppression and 
manipulation of research of the former was a concern, but not the latter.  So social scientists 
and policy analysts within the CSIRO are fair game, but leave the natural scientists alone! 
Simply calling for ‘evidence-based science’ as if this were an answer to the way in 
which science should interact with policy is to totally misunderstand the problem.  Drawing 
such simplistic divides as policy vs. science comes across as a purely rhetorical argument, 
meant to convince without any substantive meaning.  Take for example the introduction of 
genetically modified crops, which has been hotly debated in many countries including 
Australia (e.g., see Robins 2012).  Where is the divide between evidence-based science and 
policy advocacy?  That senior scientists within the CSIRO have heavily promoted research 
on such crops leaves many questions unanswered.  We might ask who funds the research, 
who benefits from the results and what norms and beliefs drive that research?  Why do these 
researchers not promote organic farming, permaculture or other alternatives? 
The presumption of evidence-based policy is that there is no community of scientists 
or institutional context within which science is conducted, and that facts always speak for 
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themselves.  Compare this with an article in Nature on nanotechnology which explains how 
science embodies the perspectives of the researchers involved.  That article concludes: 
“different positions on fundamental questions, such as the relationship between humanity and 
nature, permeate technology development and social debate. ... [They] are much more than 
simple factual descriptions ... each of them rests on different assumptions, supports different 
beliefs and leads in different directions” (Wickson 2008: 315). 
Once we move from the natural to the social sciences the claims of a dichotomy 
between facts and values becomes even more starkly ridiculous.  Mainstream economists 
pushing for carbon trading, as ‘the answer’ to human induced climate change, are implicitly 
criticising a range of social institutions which offer different regulatory options (e.g. taxes, 
direct regulation), other pathways in society (e.g., degrowth) and alternative social, 
ecological and economic futures outside of their abstract conceptions of human society as a 
money obsessed competitive trading enterprise.  That the CSIRO chooses to support some 
avenues of research rather than others is a direct reflection of its values, or today those of its 
managers.  The CSIRO Charter and the positions of those like Clark, Carr and Sacket, if 
taken seriously, would ban all social science research from the CSIRO, which would also 
need to remove all connections with industry, including the use of the word “industrial” in 
the organisation’s title.  Clearly none of these people would seriously consider closing down 
all CSIRO research advocating new industrial technologies despite these clearly creating 
societal path dependency and crossing the imagined science-policy divide.  Yet all seem to 
advocate placing social science within the confines of evidence-based fact finding, naïve 
objectivism and value free knowledge. 
In conducting social science research, such as that on carbon markets, there is no 
value free information.  All such research in promoting one set of institutional arrangements 
over another must involve a complex of facts and values.  This does not mean there is no 
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factual knowledge or social reality, but rather that knowledge requires conceptualisation and 
leads in specific directions which are far from value free. 
In the end public policy requires ethical judgement and this cannot be avoided.  We 
need institutions that allow for open debate and democratic decision processes.  As Alan 
Holland (2002: 33) has stated: 
“The penalty for not developing institutions in which ethical and other deeply felt 
concerns can be properly voiced will be residues of grievance, mistrust, injustice and 




The development of public policy on climate change has been heavily influenced by a 
scientific credo from the outset of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  This 
provides a specific instance in which science becomes involved in answering political and 
ethical questions using a set of practices and methodology ill-suited to the task, and 
employing people formally trained to believe their work, as scientific research, can and 
should be isolated from societal context and implications.  This creates a major weakness that 
has left climate science open to attack, because scientists cannot hope to live-up to their own 
claims of being providers of value free knowledge.  Rather than scientists identifying the 
failings of their own approach, admitting their own ignorance and limits to knowledge, they 
too often persist in an extreme and untenable claim to having access to the truth about reality 
based upon empiricism.  So a second major weakness has been the inability to claim total 
certainty.  This has left the door open for those who want to delay action on greenhouse gas 
control by allowing them to claim the need for more research to provide the ultimate proof. 
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Scientists who present evidence of fossil fuels being a danger to humanity and Earth's 
climate are directly criticising a set of institutions and social organisation (facts are connected 
to values).  Thus, the resource extraction and energy industries, so closely associated with 
major emission sources of greenhouse gases, and other pollutants, are inevitably the enemies 
of a science which exposes their complicity in creating social and environmental harm.  
Similarly, all those citizens who like gas guzzling cars, Formula 1 motor racing, monster 
trucks and so on will feel themselves the subject of criticism.  Indeed, anyone living a typical 
Australia, American, European or rich Chinese, Brazilian or Indian lifestyle is being held up 
to scrutiny for their high energy and material throughput.  That researchers may believe their 
factual data and findings are free from association with politics and social values is clearly 
naïve. 
In effect climate science tells us that society must remove the vast majority of fossil 
fuel combustion activities from the economy and do so quickly to avoid scenarios involving 
substantive and extensive damage and loss of life.  This science is a major criticism of 
modern industrial society, fossil fuel based economies, the competitive capitalist growth 
society and the institutions of progress it has constructed.  Ideas of freedom and progress 
have become integrated with massive energy and material consumption per capita.  Policy 
action based upon this science is then necessarily engaged in challenging some of the most 
powerful organisations in the capital accumulating modern world, both within the structures 
of Western style democracies and the totalitarian regimes of Asia and elsewhere.  
Scientifically pointing out the causal mechanisms is then akin to a political act.  Claiming 
policy and politics are things ‘scientists’ can ignore, while they get on with the real work, is 
quite simply sticking your head in the sand. 
Discovering knowledge about the world has implications for the way humanity 
organises its activities and interacts with the non-human world.  The advocacy of carbon 
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markets is based upon the naïve objectivity encapsulated in neoclassical economics and its 
pursuit of efficiency.  The lie of evidence-based science, like that of positive economics, is 
the claim that all information can be neutral and separated from the implications it has for the 
society within which that information is produced.  If facts were so easily identifiable and 
separable from values there would be little need for epistemic institutions (e.g. peer review), 
ethics in scientific conduct or critical academic debate. 
Research on biophysical reality now interacts very directly and immediately with the 
social and economic world.  Attempts to close-down and/or control critical science-policy 
debates are all too evident.  Scientists of both the social and natural type must take 
responsibility for the institutions within which they work, the uses employers make of their 
work and the implications of their work for society.  That includes exposing abuse of peer 
review processes, speaking out against inappropriate managerial and political control of 
research organisations and Universities, and avoiding work with clearly unethical 
consequences.  This also means being open about the processes used, by the community 
within which they work, to create knowledge by bounding it, and the associated problems of 
partial ignorance that this creates. 
The susceptibility of traditional institutional processes of quality control to 
manipulation and the spread of misinformation should not be underestimated.  Choosing the 
‘right’ referees, selecting the ‘right’ journal for publication, requiring use of the ‘right’ 
method of research can all be open to abuse aimed at controlling and suppressing 
information.  The natural sciences are just a vulnerable as the social sciences. 
More crudely, climate deniers try to harass and intimidate scientists and threaten their 
families in the hope that they will stop their work and others will be driven away from the 
field to less contentious research.  Many corporations and national governments have vested 
interests in continuing emissions of and destroying sinks for greenhouse gases.  Due to the 
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prevalence of naïve objectivism they can exploit scientific uncertainty and fund research to 
increase doubt.  The game is one of disempowering those who oppose their operations and 
threaten their sources of wealth and power. 
The concern then switches to how we, the researchers, can conduct investigation of a 
complex problem like controlling greenhouse gas emissions in a way that builds 
understanding.  Scientists arrogantly claiming the truth about facts in the face of strong 
uncertainty do not help.  Neither do economists arrogantly claiming the truth about the most 
efficient solutions.  None of this means reverting to an extreme postmodern doctrine of belief 
in strong social constructivism or radical relativism that denies the existence of reality or 
treats knowledge as a form of storytelling. 
Instead we can accept our fallibility and require a far more nuanced comprehension of 
how knowledge is created and used in modern society.  We can recognise there is much 
consensus on biophysical reality and that this has proven easier to achieve than consensus 
over economic and social reality.  The social world changes faster than the natural world and 
therefore needs to be reconceptualised more often to be understood.  Some facts, 
relationships and patterns are more uncertain and contestable than others.  Some uncertainty 
is also not susceptible to reduction to a scientific consensus via more research.  We then need 
institutional processes that help address strong uncertainty openly and allow for critical 
reflection and meaningful public engagement and debate. 
Knowledge is powerful and the creation of knowledge can be seen as a political act 
most clearly where it directly empowers some and disempowers others.  Control over 
information and its sources then becomes central to holding power in society.  The 
implication is that knowledge is suppressed when it has unpalatable social and economic 
implications for those in powerful positions. 
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What this means in the context of carbon markets is that the more established they 
become the harder they will be to criticise.  However, the inherent contradictions of 
promoting markets to solve the problems of the market economy can only be tolerated as 
long as the system remains functional.  While truths can be obscured, messages rewritten and 
messengers made to disappear, the resulting loss of knowledge and denial of biophysical and 
social reality will in the end lead to failure.  Over time this failure becomes increasingly 
evident socially, ecologically and economically. 
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